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Abstract
Investor-state contracts are regularly used in low- and middle-income countries to grant
concessions for land-based and natural resource investments, such as agricultural, extractive
industry, forestry, or renewable energy projects. These contracts are rarely negotiated in the
presence of, or with meaningful input from, the people who risk being adversely affected by
the project. This practice will usually risk violating requirements for meaningful consultation,
and, where applicable, free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), and is particularly
concerning when the investor-state contract gives the investor company rights to lands or
resources over which local communities have legitimate claims.
This article explores how consultation and FPIC processes can be practically integrated into
investor-state contract negotiations to better safeguard the land rights and human rights of
members of project-affected communities. Based on a review of relevant international law
standards and guidance documents, a close analysis of typical investor-state negotiations and
of consultation and consent processes in other contexts, and a workshop with Indigenous and
civil society representatives, the article provides three options for integrating consultation and
consent processes into contract negotiations, the appropriateness of which will vary
depending on local contexts and communities’ resources and decision-making structures.

Key words:
Consent, Consultation, Contracts, Investment, Negotiations
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I. Introduction
Large-scale natural resource investments can pose significant threats to the land rights and
human rights of local communities and their members. International law and guidance
documents require meaningful consultation with—and in some cases, the free, prior and
informed consent (FPIC) of—project-affected communities, and much work has been done to
articulate how this can be implemented in the context of resource investments. Yet one area
that is less explored is whether, and if so how, consultation and FPIC processes can be built
into negotiations of the investor-state contracts that grant concessions or lease land to
investor companies.4 Contract negotiations are an important stage of the investment for
community participation, as the signing of an investment contract will usually have the effect
of limiting the right to give or withhold FPIC to the proposed project, if a community has not
initially provided its FPIC. Adequately operationalizing meaningful consultation and FPIC at
the contract negotiation stage thus becomes a crucial means of protecting community rights
for later stages of the investment lifecycle.

Investor-state contracts are regularly used in low- and middle-income countries to grant
concessions or provide leases for land-based and natural resource investments, including
agricultural, forestry, extractive industry, and renewable energy projects.5 These contracts,
which are negotiated between host governments and investor companies, typically allocate
rights to access, occupy, and develop land and/or resources for the investment project, in
exchange for revenue (through land rents, taxes, and other fees) and other potential rents to

4

This article also uses the term “investors” to refer to proponent companies who seek to establish, or actually
carry out, a natural resource project in a host country. Investor-state contracts are also referred to as “investment
contracts.”
5
See, e.g., Kaitlin Y. Cordes et al., At the Intersection of Land Grievances and Legal Liability: The Need to
Reconsider Contract Rights and Expectations at the Supranational Level, 49(2) LOY. U. CHI. L. J., 515, 536
(2017) and DAVID KIENZLER ET AL., COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., NATURAL RESOURCE CONTRACTS AS
A TOOL FOR MANAGING THE MINING SECTOR 5 (2015).
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the host government, such as infrastructure development or employment creation. Investment
contracts are rarely negotiated in the presence of, or with meaningful input from, the people
who risk being adversely affected by the project, including those with legitimate claims to
lands or resources underlying the project. (Soft law instruments like the Voluntary Guidelines
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (“VGGT”) call for
the respect of all legitimate tenure rights, whether or not they are legally recognized.6) In
such scenarios, relevant requirements for meaningful consultation and, where applicable,
FPIC—whether under international law, domestic law, or industry or finance-related
standards—are arguably not satisfied.

While investor-state contracts are commonly used for agricultural, forestry and extractive
industry investments in the many parts of the global south, some countries’ domestic laws
require that companies seeking access to land or resources negotiate directly with community
representatives or local authorities, rather than with the host government. This is more
common for agricultural and forestry concessions than for extractive projects, as domestic
laws usually set out that governments hold ownership rights over sub-surface minerals,
regardless of who has legal title to the area in which such minerals are located. Jurisdictions
and scenarios where companies must negotiate directly with community representatives or
local authorities are outside the scope of this article. That said, it should not be taken for
granted that having a community representative or local authority as a contractual party
means that the government has fulfilled its obligations regarding consultation or FPIC. On
the contrary, such negotiations can concentrate power into the hands of local leaders who are

6

See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO], Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and Forests in the Context of National Food Security [hereinafter
VGGT], Principle 3, ¶¶ 3.1(1) and 3.2 (calling on states to “[r]ecognize and respect all legitimate tenure right
holders and their rights,” whether such rights are “formally recorded or not,” and stating that “business
enterprises have a responsibility to respect human rights and legitimate tenure rights”).
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not always incentivized to act in the interests of the community, or to ensure the community
remains abreast of developments and provides its FPIC.7

Of course, respect for FPIC goes far beyond simply inserting consent processes into an
anticipated or ongoing negotiation between a host government and investor. FPIC, distilled to
its essence, is about the right of Indigenous people, and at times other communities,8 to
decide for themselves how their lands and resources are used and managed. To the extent that
FPIC is required, communities must be able to access and understand relevant information,
interact with relevant stakeholders, and influence project proposals, including before the
government decides on, or grants any authorizations for, a proposed investment project.9
Similarly, for consultation to be meaningful, communities must have the opportunity to
influence decision-making on projects that will affect them. This, too, requires more than the
passive transfer of information10 or simply meeting with communities to discuss a proposed
project in general terms. Sufficient time and opportunity must be provided for community
perspectives to be incorporated into any decision-making regarding the proposed project,
through culturally appropriate processes designed in line with the community’s customary
7

See, e.g., Tom Lavers & Festus Boamah, The Impact of Agricultural Investments on State Capacity: A
Comparative Analysis of Ethiopia and Ghana, 72 GEOFORUM 94, 102 (2016) (“[I]n Ghana politically powerful
chiefs have sought to re-assert their authority over land and the local population by allocating community land
to investors, based on investors’ demands rather than the priorities of the state. This strategy has been employed
to strengthen chiefs’ territorial claims with respect to neighbouring authorities and to cultivate patron-client
networks as both local citizens and migrants in biofuel project areas are increasingly dependent on personal ties
with chiefs and other local political elites to maintain their livelihoods.”)
8
While most commonly associated with Indigenous and tribal peoples, FPIC rights have been ascribed to other
communities. See Part II(2), infra, for a discussion of FPIC rights and the many industry and multi-stakeholder
initiative standards that require the FPIC of all, and not only Indigenous, communities.
9
Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies Regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent and
Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 46(i), U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2005/3 (Feb. 17, 2005) [hereinafter International Workshop on
Methodologies]; Christian Courtis, Notes on the Implementation by Latin American Courts of the ILO
Convention 169 on Indigenous Peoples,” 18 INT’L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 433, 447 (2011);
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, Part 2: Domestic Courts – Costa Rica 5, in APPLICATION OF
CONVENTION NO. 169 BY DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASEBOOK 136, 136
(2009), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--normes/documents/publication/wcms_123946.pdf.
10
Joyce B. Mbongo Endeley & Fondo Sikud, The Social Impact of the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline: How
Industrial Development Affects Gender Relations, Land Tenure, and Local Culture 76 (2007).

Page 6

decision-making processes where applicable, rather than those imposed by the government or
company. This article thus considers that incorporating rights to consultation and FPIC into
contract negotiations can help meet those rights’ requirements for iterative and on-going
respect; we do not advocate for such processes being the first or only opportunity for
community input into decision-making.

Investor interest in land and resource investments is often cyclical. For instance, dramatically
increased food prices caused a spike in the negotiation of investment contracts concluded
between companies and host governments for agricultural projects in 2005; this “global rush
for land” slowed, without stopping, by 2012.11 Similarly, development of new projects in the
extractive industries slowed in response to dramatic drops in commodities prices that began
midway through 2014, following the “commodity supercycle”.12 While subject to change in
the immediate future, the economic impact of the Covid-19 crisis has seen a further dramatic
drop in many commodity prices.13 Financiers and other investors are also increasingly
factoring environmental and social impacts into risk analyses and decision-making, including
on issues such as climate change and land grabs. This creates a window of opportunity for
developing better consultation and FPIC practices in relation to investment contract
negotiations between companies and governments. Further, given increasing criticism of
investor-state dispute settlement and recent calls for a moratorium of investor-initiated treaty

11

Kerstin Nolte et al., International Land Deals for Agriculture: Fresh Insights from the Land Matrix: Analytical
Report II 12 (2016).
12
Lisa Sachs & Nicolas Maennling, Resource Resilience: How to Break the Commodities Cycle, WORLD POL.
REV. (May 26, 2015), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15848/resource-resilience-how-to-breakthe-commodities-cycle; Thomas Lassourd & David Manley, Guest Post: 10 Consequences of the Commodity
Crash, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/a635b463-b19f-36ef-8a81-c4c332bfe14e.
13
John Baffes & Peter Nagle, The Outlook for Commodity Markets, and the Effects of Coronavirus, in Six
Charts, WORLD BANK BLOGS, (Apr. 23, 2020), https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/outlook-commodity-marketsand-effects-coronavirus-six-charts?cid=SHR_BlogSiteShare_EN_EXT.

Page 7

claims against host governments,14 investment contracts may become even more central in
the governance of investment projects, and thus merit particularly close scrutiny. This article
does not endorse investment contracts as an optimal means of regulating resource
investments; rather, it acknowledges the prevalence of such contracts in current practices, and
the need to ensure that governments continuing to use such contracts also comply with their
consultation and FPIC obligations at the contract negotiation stage.

This article provides suggestions to assist stakeholders involved in or affected by natural
resource investments, including project-affected communities, companies, and host
governments, as well as civil society organizations and other actors working to make such
investments more responsible. It seeks to have a practical impact by articulating options for
building consultation and FPIC processes into investment contract negotiations, and by
analyzing their feasibility and the degree to which they allow for meaningful community
participation. Underlying the consideration of these options is an assumption that current
levels of community involvement at the contract negotiation stage are usually inadequate, and
that, as mentioned above, community participation at this stage cannot constitute the earliest
or full extent of consultation and FPIC processes that a government must carry out.

The article starts by examining international legal standards and best practices for informed
community participation in decision-making regarding resource investments, as well as the
steps that some communities have taken in practice to organize and democratize decisionmaking around land and resource use. It then considers investment contract negotiation
processes, which generally lack adequate community involvement, and the potential

14

Phil Bloomer et al., Call for ISDS Moratorium During COVID-19 Crisis and Response, COLUM. CTR. ON
SUSTAINABLE INV. (May 6, 2020), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2020/05/05/isds-moratorium-during-covid-19/.
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advantages for communities of being more directly involved. After exploring factors that
affect the feasibility of greater inclusion of community perspectives, the article then sets out
three options for community participation in what have typically been investor-state
negotiations, considering the opportunities and challenges of each option in ensuring an
inclusive and participatory negotiation process.

1. A proviso: Consultation and FPIC processes must take place before authorization, and
should be iterative
While this article focuses on modes of consultation and FPIC at the investment contract
negotiation stage of a project, it does not intend for such measures to constitute the full extent
of consultation and FPIC processes attached to an investment. Such an approach would
undermine two key attributes regarding the timing of consultation and consent processes.

First, only seeking to consult or obtain consent when an investment contract is being
negotiated would be too late in the investment process to comply with legal standards and
best practices. Rather, consultation and FPIC processes should commence prior to any
authorization, including before governments or local authorities grant or execute instruments
such as permits, licenses, term sheets or memoranda of understanding.15 In practice, a
meaningfully consultative and participatory process will entail informing and consulting with
affected communities, and when relevant obtaining their FPIC, before any permits are
granted as well as before the negotiation of any investment contract. There are also practical
reasons for why this is important. As time passes, and companies spend more money on
preparations for a project, governments will face increasing pressure to approve the project,
and may find it difficult to require alterations or cessation of the project where local and
15

See note 9, above.
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public interests may be at risk. In addition, communities who are only brought in at the stage
of contract negotiations may lack sufficient time to acquaint themselves with the project’s
implications and to access funding, information, skill building, and technical support to
meaningfully participate in and influence negotiations. Thus, not engaging with the
community from the earliest point feasible in a project’s conceptualization may cause delays
and create barriers to building consensus, managing expectations, and obtaining the
community’s social license to operate.16

Second, obtaining consent and consulting communities is not an obligation that can be fully
and finally satisfied at any one point in time; instead, consent and consultation processes
should take place regularly as part of “a continuous, iterative process of communication and
negotiation spanning the entire planning and project cycles.”17 Given the on-going nature of
the consultation and FPIC standards, a government’s obligations do not expire as soon as
consent is obtained.18 Continuous consultation and consent ensure a greater degree of
participation and influence for communities, and improve communication between them and
government and company representatives; this helps to safeguard the human rights that
underlie consultation and FPIC requirements,19 potentially including rights to self
determination, water, health, and food, among others.

This article’s consideration of consultation and FPIC at the contract negotiation stage will
thus mainly be relevant where: (i) the community has provided its initial FPIC to the
16

S. James Anaya & Sergio Puig, Mitigating State Sovereignty: The Duty to Consult with Indigenous Peoples
12 (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 16–42, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2876760.
17
WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING 281
(2000), https://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attachedfiles/world_commission_on_dams_final_report.pdf.
18
Anaya & Puig, supra note 16, at 15.
19
Id. at 14.
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proposed project or to being relocated sufficiently prior to contract negotiations; or (ii) where
the government permissibly determines that consent is not required, and discharges the
burden of demonstrating that no rights are being limited or affected or, if they are, that the
limitation is permissible under established international human rights law and is an
“exceptional measure”20 that “compl[ies] with certain standards of necessity and
proportionality with regard to a valid public purpose.”21 The instances in which a government
can make such a determination is a matter of unsettled debate and is not considered further in
this article. It is worth noting that where such a determination is permissibly made, best
practices still require robust consultation processes prior to any authorization or
commencement of activities; the options explored in this article may therefore still be
relevant in such scenarios.

II. Consultation and FPIC – in standards and in practice

1. Rights underpinning the need for consultation
Human rights principles set out various entitlements to information and participation for
communities and community members who may potentially be affected by a natural resource
20

International Labour Organization, Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, art. 16, ¶ 2, opened for signature June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 (entered into force
Sept. 5, 1991) [hereinafter ILO C169].
21
G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 46 (Oct. 2, 2007)
[hereinafter UNDRIP]; S. James Anaya (Former Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples),
Extractive Industries and Indigenous Peoples, ¶¶ 31–36, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/41 (July 1, 2013); Anaya & Puig,
supra note 16, at 27. Such a determination may also need to be subject to independent judicial review. U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/24/41, ¶¶ 39, 87; VGGT, ¶ 16.1 (2012). For examples of such limitations on consent and consultation
requirements, see ILO C169, art. 16, ¶ 2, and UNDRIP, art. 46, ¶ 2. Doyle notes that “[i]f the State genuinely
balances the rights and interests of others against those of indigenous peoples in the context of proposed mining
in their territories, the outcome would, in almost all cases, require the State to respect the decision of indigenous
peoples. In general, however, where consent is withheld, genuine rights-balancing exercises are not performed
on the basis of strict necessity and proportionality within a framework which guarantees respect for indigenous
peoples’ rights. This leads to a general presumption that the outcome of FPIC processes must be respected by
corporate actors if they are to comply with the corporate responsibility to respect human rights.” CATHAL M.
DOYLE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TITLE TO TERRITORY, RIGHTS, AND RESOURCES: THE TRANSFORMATIVE ROLE OF
FREE PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT (2014).
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investment. These and other rights can be interpreted as requiring governments to
meaningfully consult with such communities. Key elements of consultation for communities
in the context of a natural resource project that risks affecting them include: having access to
all relevant information regarding the project in a understandable format and at the earliest
point feasible in the proposed project’s conceptualization; having the opportunity to
deliberate internally and communicate community priorities to the government and investor;
and being able to participate in and influence relevant decisions regarding the project to the
extent that such decisions will affect the community’s rights or lands or resources.

All community members have a right to information; this is found in the protection of
freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to seek and receive information.22 The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that this right establishes a positive
obligation on states to provide information of public interest upon request,23 which can
include information regarding foreign investment contracts.24 In the context of a natural
resource investment, the right to information has been authoritatively interpreted to include
information regarding the project’s impacts on the environment,25 the fulfillment of mandates
by public bodies concerned with investment,26 and the project’s health impacts.27

22

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, ¶ 2, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Many domestic constitutions also include
a fundamental right of access to information.
23
Reyes v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 41 (Sept. 19,
2006) (applying Art 9(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, which uses identical language, namely
that “[e]very individual shall have the right to receive information”).
24
Id. ¶ 73.
25
Id.; Fatma Zohra Ksentini (Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights), Human Rights and the
Environment, ¶¶ 180, 203–16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (July 6, 1994).
26
Reyes, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, ¶ 73.
27
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health, ¶¶ 8, 11, 44, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000).
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Potentially affected community members also have a right to take part in public affairs.28 The
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination extends this
right beyond voting and standing for election to include participation of members of ethnic
minorities in “the conduct of public affairs at any level.”29 The UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, while not a source of binding jurisprudence, has interpreted the right to take
part in public affairs as including entitlements “to be fully involved in and to effectively
influence public decision-making processes that affect them,”30 and “to be consulted and to
be provided with equal and effective opportunities to be involved in decision-making
processes on all matters of public concern.”31 The Inter-American Court has also upheld
rights of communities with a “special relationship” to the land, such as those who draw
spiritual or cultural importance from the land, to effectively participate in decisions affecting
their lands and resources.32 The Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources also requires states parties to “adopt legislative and regulatory
measures necessary to ensure timely and appropriate … participation of the public in
decision-making with a potentially significant environmental impact.”33 Likewise, the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has called upon states parties to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to:

28

ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 25.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5(c), opened for
signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 5, 1991) [hereinafter ICERD].
30
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Promotion, Protection, and
Implementation of the Right to Participate in Public Affairs in the Context of the Existing Human Rights Law:
Best Practices, Experiences, Challenges, and Ways to Overcome Them, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/26 (July 23,
2015).
31
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on Factors that Impede Equal Political
Participation and Steps to Overcome Those Challenges, ¶ 89, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/29 (June 30, 2014).
32
Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 131–34 (June 15, 2005); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 82–86 (Nov. 28, 2007).
33
African Union, African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Revised Version),
art. XVI(1)(c), A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/24.1 (Jul. 11, 2003). See also id. at art. XVII(3).
29
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“confirm that all necessary measures must be taken by the State to ensure
participation, including the free, prior and informed consent of communities, in
decision-making related to natural resource governance; […and] to promote natural
resources legislation that respect human rights of all and require transparent,
maximum and effective community participation in a) decision-making about, b)
prioritisation and scale of, and c) benefits from any development on their land or
other resources, or that affects them in any substantial way.”34

2. FPIC requirements
The FPIC standard features all of the elements discussed under consultation, above, while
also placing additional control in the hands of relevant communities by focusing on the
provision of their consent. This element can change power dynamics with governments or
companies, increasing the community’s prospects of being heard and realizing its demands.
Requiring governments to obtain community consent also encourages consultations to be
conducted with a view to reaching consensus; this reorientation can lead to more meaningful
consultations, the incorporation of community perspectives into the design of proposed
projects, and, ultimately, more stable community-company relations and working
environments that increase the chances that projects will be successfully implemented.

Governments’ legal obligations regarding FPIC often extend far beyond what is commonly
acknowledged by governments themselves. Obligations to obtain the FPIC of Indigenous and
tribal communities in the context of projects that stand to affect their access to lands,

34

African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Resolution on a Human Rights-Based Approach to
Natural Resources Governance, A.U. Doc. ACHPR/Res.224 (May 2, 2012) (emphasis added).
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territories, and resources are contained, explicitly and through interpretation, in various
treaties, UN declarations, and guidelines. The consent requirement for governments
contemplating relocation of an Indigenous people in the ILO’s Convention 169 concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries35 is the only legally binding
international treaty provision that explicitly discusses consent as it may apply in the context
of natural resource-based investments. However, most states have ratified at least one, and
often many more, treaties that have been authoritatively interpreted to require FPIC. These
include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,36 the American Convention
on Human Rights,37 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights,38 among others.
Rights that have been regarded as forming a basis for FPIC include minority rights to enjoy
culture,39 rights to property and resources,40 development,41 and self-determination,42 among

35

ILO C169, supra note 20, at art. 16, ¶ 2. The article goes on to set out alternative requirements for when such
consent cannot be obtained.
36
Poma Poma v. Peru, Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1457/2006, ¶ 7.6, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (Mar. 27, 2009).
37
Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 129.
38
Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of
Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No.
276/2003, ¶ 291 (Feb. 4, 2010).
39
Poma Poma, Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1457/2006, ¶¶ 7.6 and 7.7. See also Endorois
Welfare Council, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No. 276/2003, ¶¶ 243,
248, 249, 251 (noting that a “lack of participation in decisions affecting the lives of the communities” and
forced eviction (i.e. evictions taking place without community consent) can impermissibly infringe on the right
to culture).
40
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 44 (2010),
http://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/2063. For links between rights to property, land, or natural resources
and state obligations for prior consultation and to seek consent, see Endorois Welfare Council, African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No. 276/2003, ¶¶ 226, 238, 266-268; African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights, Application No. 006/2012, Judgment (May 26, 2017), ¶ 131; Maya Indigenous Community of the
Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights [Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R.], Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 727 (2004), ¶¶ 142 and 143.
41
Endorois Welfare Council, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No.
276/2003, ¶¶ 281, 282, 290-292, 298.
42
International Law Association, Resolution No. 5/2012: Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 5 (Aug. 30, 2012);
CATHAL M. DOYLE & JILL CARIÑO, MAKING FREE, PRIOR & INFORMED CONSENT A REALITY: INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND THE EXTRACTIVE SECTOR (2013), http://www.ecojesuit.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/MakingFPIC-a-Reality-Report.pdf; EMILY GREENSPAN, FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT IN AFRICA: AN
EMERGING STANDARD FOR EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY PROJECTS 5 (2014). See also Nathan Yaffe, Indigenous
Consent: A Self-Determination Perspective, 19 MELB. J. INT’L L. 703, 712 (2018), (interpreting the judgment in
Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 137 as “a formulation that adverted to the centrality of
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others. The United Nations’ Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have also recommended that consent
processes apply in the context of non-Indigenous communities, including “local
communities,”43 “ethnic groups,”44 “afro-Colombian people,”45 and “vulnerable communities,
including pastoralist and hunter-gatherer communities.”46 FPIC requirements for any project
affecting an Indigenous people’s lands, territories, or other resources are also contained in the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which is not technically
binding, but is regarded as synthesizing various customary international law principles.47
Similar FPIC requirements are echoed by the VGGT, another soft law document. Some
domestic laws also impose FPIC rights for all communities; for instance, in Liberia, FPIC is
mandated for future “interferences” with customary lands, subject to the government’s right
to subsurface minerals.48

While the implementation of FPIC in practice will vary from case to case, some core
components are required. The government is obligated to engage directly with the community
through the community’s own customary representative decision-making structures, and to
make good faith efforts to reach agreement on just terms.49 The government must also find
ways to mitigate power imbalances, both within the community and between the community

self-determined governance,” and noting that “the IACtHR held ‘the safeguard of effective participation ... must
be understood to additionally require the free, prior, and informed consent of the Saramakas, in accordance with
their traditions and customs.’”)
43
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Mexico, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/MEX/CO/4, (June 9, 2006).
44
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations: Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/LAO/CO/15, (Apr. 18, 2005).
45
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Colombia, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/COL/CO/, (June 7, 2010).
46
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: United Republic of Tanzania,
¶ 22, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/TZA/CO/1-3, (Dec. 13, 2012).
47
UNDRIP, supra note 21, at art. 32, ¶ 2..
48
The Land Rights Act 2018, art. 33(3) (Liber.).
49
International Workshop on Methodologies, supra note 9, at ¶ 47; Anaya & Puig, supra note 16, at 23–24.
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and other actors, such as companies, to ensure that any consent obtained is “free” from
coercion or manipulation.50 This may include requirements to facilitate the community’s
access to independent technical support and other resources.51 Consultation and consent
processes must be conducted sufficiently “prior” to the granting of authorizations and the
commencement of the project, with relevant information regarding the project provided in an
accessible format so that the community is “informed.”52 For the FPIC standard to be met, the
government must also obtain the community’s “consent.”53 “Consent” also implies that the
government must respect the community’s free and informed decision, regardless of the
outcome.54

While governments are the primary duty-bearers of obligations under international human
rights law, businesses have responsibilities to respect human rights, which includes respect
for FPIC rights. More generally, soft law instruments like the UN Guiding Principles on
50

International Workshop on Methodologies, supra note 9, at ¶ 46(i); Anaya & Puig, supra note 16, at 23–24.
See, e.g., Report of the then Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of
indigenous people, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34 (July 15, 2009) (noting that consultation procedures for
Indigenous peoples are often “not effective” and that imbalances of power need to be addressed by, among other
things, ensuring communities have the “financial, technical and other assistance they need” without such
assistance being used “to leverage or influence indigenous positions in the consultations”); Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ rights over their ancestral lands and natural resources, ¶ 312,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II (Dec. 30, 2009) (“… States may be required to provide [Indigenous] peoples with other means,
which can include technical and independent assistance, in order for indigenous peoples to be able to adopt fully
informed decisions.).
52
See note 9, above.
53
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 134 (Nov. 28, 2007); Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and
Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No. 276/2003, ¶ 291 (Feb. 4, 2010); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendent Communities, and Natural Resources: Human Rights Protection in the
Context of Extraction, Exploitation, and Development Activities, ¶ 183, OEA/Ser.L/V/II 93 (Dec. 31, 2016);
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous
People, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/90 (Jan. 21, 2003); Emily Greenspan, The Right to Say “No”: Indigenous
Rights Experts Weigh in on Community Consent, POL. POVERTY (Aug. 20, 2015) (quoting Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R. chair Rose-Marie Belle Antoine and United Nations special rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples
Victoria Tauli-Corpuz). Cf Anaya & Puig, supra note 16, at 2, 18 (focusing on FPIC as a duty for meaningful
consultation, which acts as a balancing function to mitigate adverse impacts on the human rights of Indigenous
peoples) and Anaya, supra note 21, ¶¶ 31–36 (discussing exceptions to the general FPIC requirement).
54
Cathal Doyle, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights: Is HRIA An Enabler For Free, Prior And Informed Consent?, in
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Nora Götzmann ed. 2019), p. 136. See also discussion of
the necessity and proportionality exception attached to note 21, above.
51
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Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) set out the need for strong human rights due diligence
and consultation processes.55 The Principles for Responsible Contracts, annexed to the
UNGPs, also emphasize the need for an “effective community engagement plan through [the
project’s] life cycle.”56 Outside of explicit human rights frameworks, businesses have
increasingly embraced commitments to FPIC, both through certifications schemes and
specific company policies. These FPIC commitments often apply to all local communities.
For example, the standards and criteria of the Forest Stewardship Council57 and the
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil,58 and the EO100 Standard for Responsible Energy
Development,59 set out FPIC requirements for all relevant local communities for different
aspects of forestry, oil palm, and renewable energy concessions, respectively. Individual food
and beverage companies have also made overarching commitments to FPIC.60

3. Consultation and FPIC standards relating to contract negotiations
Although several guidance documents highlight the need for consultation with, or informed
participation of, affected communities in the negotiation of investment contracts, existing
guidance on how this could be undertaken in practice generally lacks granular detail. Some

55

John Ruggie (Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, ¶ 18(b), U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).
56
John Ruggie (Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the
Management of Human Rights Risks into State-Investor Contract Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators, ¶ 24,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31/Add.3 (May 25, 2011).
57
Forest Stewardship Council, FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, § 4.8 (July 22, 2015).
58
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production, criteria 2.3,
7.5 and 7.6 (2007).
59
Equitable Origin, EO100 Standard for Responsible Energy, objective 2.5 (2017), https://pronto-corecdn.prontomarketing.com/2/wp-content/uploads/sites/1738/2018/09/EO100-Standard-for-Responsible-EnergyDevelopment_2017.pdf.
60
See, e.g., Coca-Cola Company, The Coca-Cola Company Commitment: Land Rights and Sugar (2013)
(stating that “[t]he Coca-Cola Company will adhere to the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent across
our operations (including bottling partners) and will require our suppliers to adhere to this principle”),
http://assets.coca-colacompany.com/6b/65/7f0d386040fcb4872fa136f05c5c/proposal-to-oxfam-on-land-tenureand-sugar.pdf.
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guidance documents merely stress the general need for consultation before signing, and
during the negotiation of, investment contracts. Other guidance documents go further,
exhorting that legitimate tenure right holders be included in project design or negotiations but
still not explaining the mechanisms for how this would occur and be linked to investor-state
negotiations.

Guidance regarding the general need for community consultation and participation before the
execution, and during the negotiation, of investment contracts can be found in the Principles
for Responsible Contracts, which set out that “consultation with the affected communities
and individuals should take place before the contract is finalized.”61 These Principles also
emphasize the need for community engagement plans, but do not explore in great detail the
specific consultation and FPIC processes that could be employed for contract negotiations.
Similarly, the African Union’s Guiding Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investments in
Africa assert that communities affected by large-scale land-based investment should be
“provided sufficient information, consulted on their views prior to finalizing [large-scale
land-based investment] agreements and [have] these views taken into consideration.”62 The
VGGT also note that “[a]ll forms of transactions in tenure rights as a result of investments in
land, fisheries and forests should be done transparently” and that “[c]ontracting parties should
provide comprehensive information to ensure that all relevant persons are engaged and
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Ruggie, supra note 56, § II(G).
African Union, African Development Bank and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Guiding
Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investments in Africa 15 (2014). See also id. at 13 (“In order that
decisions on LSLBI respond to local and national development priorities, devolution of decision-making
authority to appropriate levels, meaningful participation by those affected by the investments in decisionmaking are required along with transparency throughout the negotiation, approval, contracting and
implementation process.”).
62
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informed in the negotiations, and should seek that the agreements are documented and
understood by all who are affected.”63

Several sources of guidance stress the importance of including affected communities and
legitimate tenure right holders in negotiations for land-based investments. For example, the
Guide to Due Diligence of Agribusiness Projects that Affect Land and Property Rights,
prepared by the French government’s Technical Committee on “Land Tenure and
Development,” discusses pertinent considerations, including whether local people were
consulted and involved in negotiations, whether the contract was made public, whether local
authorities or representatives of local people were co-signatories to the contract, and whether
local people were invited to participate in the process of negotiating the contract and
commenting on draft versions.64 In addition, in 2009 the then-UN Special Rapporteur on the
right to food highlighted that it is “vital that the negotiations leading to [large-scale land
acquisitions and leases] comply with a number of procedural requirements ensuring informed
participation of the local communities.”65 Other guidance documents emphasize the
importance of consultation and participation but are vague regarding whether and how such
practices should interact with investor-state negotiations. For example, the USAID
Operational Guidelines for Responsible Land-Based Investment urge companies to “include
in negotiations those who use or claim the land […], even if their rights are not formally
recognized.”66 Similarly, the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’s Analytical
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VGGT, ¶¶ 12.3, 12.11.
Technical Committee on “Land Tenure and Development,” Guide to Due Diligence of Agribusiness Projects
that Affect Land and Property Rights 25–27, 61–63 (2014), http://www.foncier-developpement.fr/wpcontent/uploads/Guide-to-due-diligence.pdf. The Technical Committee is co-chaired by France’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the French Development Agency.
65
Oliver de Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases: A
Set of Minimum Principles and Measures to Address the Human Rights Challenge, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/13/33/Add.2 (Dec. 22, 2009).
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Framework for Land-Based Investments in African Agriculture notes that companies should
“[i]dentify those who legally own the land, as well as those who have other legitimate rights
over the land,” “[i]nclude both groups in negotiation, even if only legal owner signs the
contract,” and “[e]nsure that the entity or person signing the contract has legal authority to do
so.”67 These suggestions raise interesting questions regarding how to incorporate legitimate
right holders in negotiations, whether negotiating separate side agreements would suffice, and
what type of influence legitimate right holders might have in such processes if they are not
allowed to sign the contract.

4. Consultation and FPIC in practice
Many communities have organized to articulate and litigate their demands and to advocate to
governments and companies regarding the shape that consultation and FPIC processes can
take.68 Key to these demands has been a focus on FPIC as a means of community-driven
decision-making and a vehicle for self-determination;69 this emphasizes self-determination’s
“internal aspect,” which includes the “rights of all peoples to pursue freely their economic,
social and cultural development without outside interference.”70
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NEW ALL. FOR FOOD SEC. & NUTRITION, ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR LAND-BASED INVESTMENTS IN
AFRICAN AGRICULTURE: DUE DILIGENCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR LAND-BASED INVESTMENTS IN
AGRICULTURE 12 (2015).
68
See, e.g., Baleni v. Minister for Natural Resources 2019 (2) SA 453 (GP) (S. Afr.); Yatama v. Nicaragua,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, ¶ 224 (June 23,
2005).
69
DOYLE & CARIÑO, supra note 42, at 15; International Law Association, Resolution No. 5/2012: Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, section I, para. 5 (concluding that states are obliged by “customary and applicable
convention international law” to ensure FPIC and the rights to participation and consultation as a prerogative of
the obligation to recognize and promote the right of Indigenous peoples to autonomy or self-government).
70
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 21: The Right to SelfDetermination, annex VIII, U.N. Doc. A/51/18 (Aug. 23, 1996) [hereinafter General Recommendation 21]. See
also Indigenous Representative, Intervention at Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment and Middlesex
University Workshop (Apr. 25, 2019) (“They think we want FPIC because we want money. It’s not about
money, it’s a different lifestyle between the mother earth and the people.”); Lorenzo Cotula, Reconsidering
Sovereignty, Ownership and Consent in Natural Resource Contracts: From Concepts to Practice, in 9
EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 143 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2018)
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One approach that Indigenous communities have used to enact the right to self-determination
has been the development of community protocols, which set out culturally appropriate ways
for external actors to interact with a community, and processes for seeking to obtain its
consent.71 Many community protocols have been developed in anticipation of potential
projects or events, allowing communities to proactively set the agenda for how decisions
regarding their lands and resources will be made. Community members within the Indigenous
reserve of Cañamono Lomapretia in Colombia, for instance, developed a protocol that sets
out detailed consultation procedures and requirements that must take place prior to any
administrative act, including the granting of concessions and permissions for investment
projects within the reserve.72 The protocol, while not intended to only apply to extractive
projects, goes so far as stating that the communities have made a pre-determined decision to
withhold consent for large-scale mining or mining that uses cyanide or mercury.73 Other
communities have developed protocols as a response to existing impacts by extractives
projects, setting rules and processes for ongoing or future projects.74 Such protocols will be
most effective when developed in advance of a project, especially given that Indigenous
peoples often regard having the ability to design and control an FPIC process as a core part of
operationalizing their right to self-determination.75 Protocols can also be initiated at other
stages of the investment project—to help communities build capacity and organize, and to

(conceptualizing the self-determination as an exercise of the sovereignty “that ultimately resides in the peoples,”
and contrasting it with the role of the state, which is to “provide the organisational structures through which
sovereignty is held and exercised in international legal relations”).
71
See, e.g., DOYLE & CARIÑO, supra note 42, at 29–40; JAEL MAKAGON ET AL., BALANCING THE SCALES:
COMMUNITY PROTOCOLS AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES – LESSONS FROM ARGENTINA, INDIA, KENYA AND
ZIMBABWE (2016), https://za.boell.org/sites/default/files/balancing_the_scales.pdf; VIVIANE WEITZNER,
DEALING FULL FORCE: LUTSEL K’E DENE FIRST NATION’S EXPERIENCE NEGOTIATING WITH MINING COMPANIES
33–34 (2006).
72
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DOYLE & CARIÑO, supra note 42, at 4, 17, 18.
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assist external actors to engage appropriately with the community—although they won’t be
able to ensure that the FPIC standard is complied with at the earliest stages of decisionmaking in such circumstances.76

In organizing to engage in consultation and FPIC processes, some communities have also
sought to democratize their representation. This has included developing processes for
community members to elect community liaison committees and any representatives
participating in negotiations with the host government and the investor.77 In other instances,
communities have used national and local legal frameworks to hold referenda regarding
whether or not a proposed project should be allowed to proceed.78 FPIC protocols also help
communities to make decisions collectively, avoiding the potential of one individual
overriding the interest of the collective.79

These efforts to organize and democratize community decision-making related to resource
investments can be complemented by best practice measures to ensure the views of different
segments of a community are adequately represented during consultation and FPIC processes.
While these different strategies for internal organization, deliberation, and preparation
regarding incoming investment projects will most effectively be invoked at the initial stages
of decision-making regarding the investment and before authorizations have been granted,
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they can also help with decision-making regarding the question of community consultation
regarding, or participation in, investment contract negotiations.

III. Negotiating investment contracts
1. The negotiation process
Investor companies and host states enter into various types of contracts for natural resource
projects, most of which are negotiated before project operations begin. In addition to
concluding contracts, companies will typically conduct feasibility studies, carry out scoping
of the project’s potential environmental or social impacts, and seek to obtain finance and the
necessary permits needed for the project under domestic law. Whether the investment
contract is negotiated before or after these steps will depend in large part on the domestic law
and the purpose of the contract.80

Investment contract negotiations differ in terms of length, and the number of negotiation
sessions and persons involved. In some cases, there can be multiple contracts between the
same parties for the one project: for example, the investor company and the government
might decide to negotiate an investment incentive contract (or memorandum of
understanding), in order to then obtain finance, followed by a more substantial concession or
lease agreement, and various side agreements. (They also will often negotiate additional
contracts with other actors—for example, lenders that provide financing to the project,
suppliers of goods and services necessary for operations, and purchasers of crops
produced/resources exploited.) In addition, parties may subsequently renegotiate or amend
relevant contracts based on changes in circumstances. The time that a negotiation for any
80

SAM SZOKE-BURKE & KAITLIN Y. CORDES, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., GOVERNING LAND
INVESTMENTS: DO GOVERNMENTS HAVE LEGAL SUPPORT GAPS? 23–24 (2017),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/07/14-Columbia-CCSI-land-report-full-US-letter-mr-hyperlinks.pdf
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particular contract or set of contracts takes will depend on the complexity of the project, and
the extent to which those negotiating in the room have the authority to sign off on
commitments proposed, among other factors. In some cases—including for some investment
contracts regulating complex extractive projects81—negotiations can take years; in other
cases, negotiated agreements barely differ from investment contracts previously negotiated in
the country with other companies, potentially indicating that they were the result of a much
shorter negotiation period.

Negotiations themselves are unpredictable, as a government and company might have widely
varying expectations for the contract. The style of negotiations can also vary depending on
the priorities of those participating and their ability to control the negotiation process. For
instance, negotiations can be “rents-based,” focusing on the “economic equilibrium of the
contract,” including the maximization of profits and the minimization of costs; alternatively,
parties can work towards an “interests-based” negotiation, where the negotiations seek to
incorporate the interests (financial and non-financial) of each party or stakeholder.82

2. Status quo: Inadequate consultation and FPIC processes
Governments and companies typically negotiate investment contracts without the knowledge,
consent, or participation of communities that stand to be affected by the investment.
Oftentimes, communities are unable to access applicable investment contracts even after they

81

KIENZLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 4 (“The agreement for the Simandou iron ore project in Guinea took a
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CARIN SMALLER ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE IISD GUIDE TO NEGOTIATING INVESTMENT
CONTRACTS FOR FARMLAND AND WATER 12 (2014), http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisdguide-negotiating-investment-contracts-farmland-water_1.pdf.
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have been signed.83 This approach does not satisfy requirements for meaningful consultation
and, when relevant, FPIC, given the need for consultation and FPIC processes to be
conducted iteratively, as discussed above. Such an approach also ignores the core objective of
consultation and FPIC requirements, which is to avoid non-consensual infringements on
community lands, territories, resources, self-governance, and cultural rights. Mere advance
notification that there will be negotiations, and the provision of general information about the
proposed investment, would be inadequate to safeguard community rights to participation
and FPIC, unless opportunities also exist for the community to share its perspective and
influence negotiations, and, where relevant, give or withhold their FPIC. Such an approach
also fails to provide opportunity for communities to react to unforeseen changes in
negotiations and increases the risk of violations of community land tenure rights, in addition
to rights to participation and, where relevant, FPIC and self-determination. It also excludes
the community from decision-making in relation to the lands and resources on which they
may depend to maintain their livelihoods and ways of life.

A lack of community involvement in negotiations provokes additional concerns when the
contract requires the investor company to subsequently negotiate a community development
agreement with the community, or to deliver social benefits. The community’s absence
during the investment contract negotiations may undermine its ability to shape and influence
any subsequent community-investor negotiations, given that the parameters of the investment
itself have already been set. In addition, the absence of community input increases the risk
that any local development requirements in the investment contract will not be appropriately
adjusted to the rights or priorities of the community, and will instead be determined, and will
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be subject to trade-offs and compromise made, by stakeholders less familiar with the
community’s needs and with different agendas and priorities than the community.

3. Advantages for communities in participating in negotiations
Even where community-company agreements for revenue sharing, local employment creation,
and other rent distribution is legally required84 or voluntarily pursued by companies in a
separate agreement,85 community members may find it advantageous to directly participate in
investment contract negotiations. While this will be for the community to decide in each case,
there are at least four potential advantages for community members in participating in
investment contract negotiations.

First, the substance of the investment contract will affect the operation of the investment, and
its impacts on local communities. Investment contracts cover issues pertinent to local
communities; these include: social and environmental protections, which can be designed to
protect relevant community interests and the resources on which communities rely; the
concession’s boundaries and size, which may have impacts on community members’ use of
land and resources; and company-reporting requirements on fiscal, environmental, and other
issues, which provide an important accountability mechanism. Fiscal reporting can also help
communities monitor the profitability of the project, which can be relevant to determining
community entitlements pursuant to revenue sharing arrangements, and can help to manage
expectations regarding the project’s viability more generally. Investment contracts may also
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contain clauses that can be enforceable against communities, such as company rights to
exclusive possession and to engage security forces.86

Investment contracts also often detail the specific business model that a project will take,
which in turn can affect the amount of revenue that will be shared with the community or the
number of local jobs created through a community development agreement, as well as more
general impacts on local land use, sources of livelihood, and the environment. Take, for
instance, a recent study of an oil palm and rubber tree concession in Liberia, which viewed
the company’s large-scale land concession model as “at a crossroads.”87 The report detailed
two potential alternative scenarios to the company’s intention to develop the concession
without obtaining FPIC. The first scenario involved proceeding with the investment but
respecting buffer zones, obtaining FPIC, and preserving forests; the second involved ceasing
to expand the company’s own plantations and instead transitioning to an outgrower model
and relying on small-scale farmers.88 The potential variations in the company’s business
model for the project would also have very different impacts on local communities. (Even if
the company did pursue a concession model, additional outgrower commitments could still
be secured, which would potentially be of interest to the communities that stand to be
affected.) Given that a project’s business model is often outlined in an investment contract,
local communities might therefore wish to participate in investment contract negotiations, to
advocate for specific models that best meet their needs, and to warn against models that may
be particularly disruptive to the community.
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A second advantage for communities is that there may be opportunities to influence the
negotiation of investment contracts to include greater enforceability mechanisms for any
related community development agreement. Depending on the mode of consultation or
consent, communities could: advocate for the inclusion of a clause in the investment contract
that deems relevant company breaches of the community development agreement to
constitute breaches of the investment contract; advocate for clauses that make the community
a third party beneficiary with enforceable rights; or, where the community is to be a party to
the investment contract, potentially fold the substance of a community development
agreement into the investment agreement.89

Third, building community consultation or FPIC into investment contract negotiations can
help to set the investor’s and government’s expectations regarding the degree to which the
community intends to participate throughout the life of the project, in line with the on-going,
iterative aspect of FPIC. This can encourage strict company compliance with the obligations
included in the contract as well as providing a stronger basis for future requests from the
community for meetings or the disclosure of project-related information. The increased
exposure to company and government representatives may also serve to empower community
members, enabling them to understand those representatives’ motivations and perspectives
and increasing their ability to influence decision-making.

Fourth, communities participating in negotiations will be better placed to set robust
requirements for the sale or assignment of the investment to a new company. The business
89

Further research would be needed to fully understand the potential benefits and drawbacks of having only one
agreement that acts as both a tripartite investment contract and a community development agreement. There also
may be limited practical benefits to deeming company breaches of a community agreement to constitute
breaches of the investment contract, as host governments will often not take action to enforce such a breach.
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drivers for proponent companies change, and such companies may seek to assign or sell their
rights and responsibilities for different reasons. Incoming corporate assignees may have
radically different understandings and approaches to community engagement and
participation, which can drastically undermine any pre-existing arrangements aimed at
fostering meaningful community participation.90 Close community involvement in contract
negotiations can make communities as well placed as possible for future assignments,
including by demanding contractual requirements to consult and obtain the community’s
FPIC regarding any decision to assign.91 Communities benefiting from option three,
discussed below, will also be best placed to set the incoming company’s expectations, given
their involvement as parties to the investment contract.

IV. Modes of consultation and FPIC for investment contract negotiations
This section starts with a discussion of the importance of the community having influence
over how it will participate in contract negotiations, before detailing factors that will affect
how communities can participate and influence decision-making regarding investment
contract negotiations in any particular case. It then explores three proposed alternative
options for building consultation and FPIC into investment contract negotiations, analyzing
the benefits and challenges that each option offers for fostering meaningful participation and
creating opportunities for communities to influence the outcomes of the contract.

90

Indigenous Representative, Intervention at Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment and Middlesex
University Workshop (Apr. 25, 2019).
91
SAM SZOKE-BURKE ET AL., COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., COMMUNITY-INVESTOR NEGOTIATION GUIDE
2: NEGOTIATING CONTRACTS WITH INVESTORS 50–51 (2018), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/09/51namati_ccsi-guide-2-full-online-lr-compressed.pdf.
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1. Ensuring that the community has a say
The decision as to which mode of consultation or consent is most appropriate will vary from
case to case, and should correspond with the community’s expressed preference. The
government should thus consult with the community regarding how it should participate in
investment contract negotiations, taking into account the community’s internal organization
and decision-making structures.92 Such an approach is especially important for Indigenous
communities and ethnic minorities, whose right to self-determination extends to having the
right to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural development without outside
interference.93 Consultation on the question of participation should also include opportunities
for representatives of marginalized community segments to contribute their perspective.94

Key to any mode of community participation will be the allocation of sufficient resources and
time for the community to prepare itself to be able to decide on its preferred mode of
participation, to adequately prepare and decide on key priorities within the community, and
then to meaningfully participate. This may require support in developing relevant skills and
knowledge—potentially on topics including contract negotiations, human rights, the type of
92

Indigenous Representative, Intervention at Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment and Middlesex
University Workshop (Apr. 25, 2019) (“[W]e need to also show the governments how consultation should be.
We would like the state to clearly ask us how we’d like to be consulted.”); Ute Dieckmann & Ben BegbieClench, Chapter 19: Consultation, Participation and Representation, in “SCRAPING THE POT”: SAN IN NAMIBIA
TWO DECADES AFTER INDEPENDENCE 595, 597–598 (Ute Dieckmann et al. eds., 2014) (noting the discussion by
the ILO’s Senior Specialist on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Issues, Dr. Albert Barume, of the need for
“[d]esigning with the participation of indigenous peoples the consultation and participation framework and
mechanism . . . (consultation on consultation)”).
93
UNDRIP, supra note 21, at arts. 3–4; General Recommendation 21, supra note 70, at 125, ¶ 4 (referring to the
right to self-determination’s “internal aspect”).
94
This will be especially important where customary processes and structures risk not being sufficiently
inclusive and representative of different community segments. See OXFAM & LEGAL RES. CTR., FREE, PRIOR
AND INFORMED CONSENT IN THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION
AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION IN MALAWI, MOZAMBIQUE, SOUTH AFRICA, ZIMBABWE, AND ZAMBIA 87 (2018)
(“[D]o the benefits of organising in terms of customary law outweigh its dangers? There is no simple answer to
that question: while we intuitively believe that the power imbalances within customary communities can be
solved through statutory regulation, it has been shown that an imposition of ‘foreign’ norms and standards on
communities is not an effective way of changing the way people engage with each other. . . . The better
approach, we argue, is to start with the values the communities hold and develop these to be brought in line with,
for example, international human rights principles. The fluidness of customary law provides opportunities for
such development to happen rapidly and bottom-up.”)
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project proposed, approaches to communal decision-making, representation and consultation
with different segments of the community, and so on—as well as access to legal and other
support, and access to sufficient information regarding the proposed project in a form that
community members can understand.95 Financing for such support and empowerment could
come from proponent companies and other investment chain actors, who could be
encouraged or required to make financial contributions into an independently administered
basket fund for community support.96

2. Factors affecting increased community involvement in investment contract negotiations
This subsection considers different factors that may affect how, or the degree to which, a
community can be more closely involved in the negotiation of an investment contract.97 The
government should be strongly influenced by the community’s stated preference for the mode
of their inclusion in the investment contracting stage. In practice, however, the government
may perceive its obligations to comply with human rights law requirements for consultation
and FPIC to be in tension with its investment promotion objectives. This perception may
persist despite research linking project failure and companies’ significant loss of revenue to
their failure to implement a sufficiently robust community engagement strategy. 98 Such
perceptions often create pressures to attract investment, including by “streamlining” the
95

See WEITZNER, supra note 71, at 1 for an example of peer-to-peer sharing. The document was prepared by the
Lutsel K’e Dene First Nation as “a direct response to a request from the Association of Indigenous Village
Leaders of Suriname (VIDS) for Canadian Indigenous People to provide capacity-building support to
communities in West Suriname who will be affected by proposed open-pit, large-scale bauxite mining by BHP
Billiton and Suralco, large-scale hydro-electric development by Suralco, and a nature reserve proposed by the
Government of Suriname and the World Wildlife Fund.”
96
See COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., GUIDE FOR DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING A BASKET FUND FOR
COMMUNITY SUPPORT IN THE CONTEXT OF INVESTMENT PROJECTS (2020); SAM SZOKE-BURKE & KAITLIN Y.
CORDES, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., INNOVATIVE FINANCING SOLUTIONS FOR COMMUNITY SUPPORT
IN THE CONTEXT OF LAND-BASED INVESTMENT 17 (2019), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2019/03/22/innovativefinancing-solutions-for-community-support-in-the-context-of-land-investments/.
97
These factors are also relevant to FPIC and meaningful consultation more generally, but are treated
specifically with regard to the contract negotiation stage of an investment.
98
ANNA LOCKE ET AL., ASSESSING THE COSTS OF TENURE RISKS TO AGRIBUSINESSES 11 (2019),
https://landportal.org/library/resources/qtr-report-2019/assessing-costs-tenure-risks-agribusinesses.
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processes needed for companies to be granted concessions and authorizations, even though
the abandonment of transparency and other good governance practices can degrade the
quality of investment.99 Of course, the below factors do not provide a legal justification for
failing to comply with requirements for consultation and FPIC, including at the investment
contract negotiation stage. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider how the perspectives and
incentives of both governments and companies can affect the feasibility of different modes of
community consultation and FPIC being integrated into contract negotiations in practice.

One factor that can add to pressure for community inclusion is the applicable domestic legal
framework, including laws, regulations, policies, court decisions, and any treaties or other
instruments of settlement between the government and communities regarding claims to
customary lands and resources. For instance, a tripartite investment contract for a Pooling and
Sharing Joint Venture between the South African government, the government-owned
Alexkor diamond mining company, and a corporate vehicle established and controlled by
members of the Richtersveld community100 was entered into pursuant to a deed of settlement
between the government and the community following the community’s successful court
claims to ancestral lands and resources.101 In South Sudan, the Tindilo community’s reported
participation in investment contract negotiations, discussed in the next paragraph, also may
have been slightly bolstered by recently enacted land legislation which set out, albeit in

99

Frederick Lehmann & Ana Teresa Tavares-Lehmann, Transparency and Inward Investment Incentives, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSPARENCY 308–09 (Jens Forssbaeck & Lars
Oxelheim eds., 2015).
100
See LORENZO COTULA, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV., INVESTMENT CONTRACTS AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: HOW TO MAKE CONTRACTS FOR FAIRER AND MORE SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE
INVESTMENTS 28 (Box 3) (2010); James Gathii & Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, The Turn to Contractual
Responsibility in the Global Extractive Industry, 1 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 69, 91 (2015); RESEARCH UNIT OF THE
PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, ALEXKOR: RICHTERSVELD COMMUNITY AND THE POOLING
AND SHARING JOINT VENTURE (PSJV) (2016), http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west1.amazonaws.com/161012alexkorr.pdf.
101
Alexkor Ltd v. Richtersveld Community 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) para. 62 (S. Afr.); Richtersveld Community v.
Alexkor Ltd 2003 (2) All SA 27 (Supreme Court of Appeal) para. 18 (S. Afr.).
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undetailed terms, that administration of the country’s land shall be based on principles
including participation and transparency.102

The political and economic context may encourage or discourage greater community
involvement in negotiations. For instance, state-level authorities from Southern Sudan
reportedly faced some political pressure to meaningfully involve the Tindilo community in
investment contract negotiations with Tree Farms Sudan Ltd., given that a recent peace
agreement included a statement—which also happened to be the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement’s slogan—that the “land belongs to the community.”103 Similarly, where the
government is willing to increase community involvement but the investor company is
reluctant, the government may be able to leverage existing conditions, such as favorable
economic conditions for the project, tight timelines, or the fact that certain permits have not
yet been granted, to encourage or mandate more participatory processes.104 In addition,
piloting efforts to increase community participation in negotiations may lead to expectations
for improved community consultation in future negotiations. For instance, community
participation in environmental agreement negotiations for the Ekati Diamond Mine
“crystallized expectations about the degree of Aboriginal participation in environmental
agreements for major Canadian projects,” making it “virtually impossible to return to a
process of closed negotiations between governments and project proponents in this

102

CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (CHRGJ), FOREIGN LAND DEALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
CASE STUDIES ON AGRICULTURAL AND BIOFUEL INVESTMENT 51 (2010).
103
Id. at 48 n.349, 51.
104
See, e.g., Natasha Affolder, Rethinking Environmental Contracting, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC., 155, 164
(2010) (discussing the Canadian government’s strategy for including Aboriginal communities in some
contractual negotiations for the Ekati Diamond Mine). O’Faircheallaigh also notes that the national and
territorial government parties were “determined that development of Ekati should not be prevented or
substantially delayed.” CIARAN O’FAIRCHEALLAIGH, The Ekati Diamond Mine, Northwest Territories, in
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE INDIGENOUS WORLD 148 (2015).
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region.”105 On the other hand, in contexts where corruption, rent-seeking, or patron-client
relationships are prevalent, elite actors may view broad community participation as a threat to
their ability to maintain such illicit dealings and relationships, and may seek to ensure that
community members are excluded from the negotiation table.106

Companies desiring to obtain social license to operate in the area may also be receptive to
enabling the community to more meaningfully participate in decision-making and contract
negotiations.107 For instance, in the abovementioned Tree Farms Sudan example, a company
representative stressed that the long-term nature of the project meant that the company
needed “a local community who looks upon the project as their property, so they can guard
and protect the plantation themselves.”108 Additionally or alternatively, the investor company
may face pressures from its headquarters office, parent company, financiers, or investors to
engage in international best practices. One example is found in the participation by
Aboriginal representatives in negotiations between the Government of the Northwest
Territories of Canada and a diamond mining company regarding both an Environmental
Agreement and a Socio-Economic Agreement for the Ekati Diamond Mine. A representative
from the company noted that by including Aboriginal communities in the negotiations, the
company sought to demonstrate innovations in community engagement to maintain its parent
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Affolder, supra note 104, at 169. The environmental agreement was called for by Canada’s Department of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development and was intended to “cover all those issues which are not normally
part of license terms and conditions. It will provide a visible record of the commitments of the company to carry
out environmental monitoring, monitoring programs, and to prevent and mitigate environmental impacts.” Id, at
163.
106
See, e.g., Sam Szoke-Burke & Eric Werker, Benefit Sharing through Project-Level Multi-Stakeholder
Institutions: Community Benefit Agreements, Rent Sharing, and the Performance of New Institutions in the
Ahafo Mine in Ghana (forthcoming) (describing how chiefs may be personally incentivized to form “spoiler
coalitions” with local company representatives rather than allowing for meaningful participation by other
community segments in investment-related decision-making).
107
This is not to equate social license to operate, which is fundamentally based in obtaining community
acquiescence to a project with FPIC, which is a formal legal standard that has more rigorous normative
requirements.
108
CHRGJ, supra note 102, at 52
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company’s interest in the project, which was at risk of waning because of a slow and costly
permitting phase.109

Having considered various factors that may affect the likelihood or feasibility of building
improved modes of consultation or FPIC into investment contract negotiations, this article
now explores three proposed options for doing so.

3. Option one: Periodic consultations during negotiations
An obvious option for increasing meaningful participation and providing for iterative consent
processes is to make the negotiations subject to regular community consultations.
Specifically, any relevant investor-state negotiation process would need to include sufficient
opportunity for consultations and to obtain consent as necessary, with such processes being
based on an informed understanding of negotiations to date and being able to influence
continued negotiations. Under this option, a government and company that plan to conduct
negotiations in the absence of community representatives and civil society organizations
would conduct negotiations in “rounds,” with corresponding consultations and consent
processes taking place between each round, based on the latest draft version of the
contract.110 The dates of negotiation rounds could be set at the outset; in addition, rules could
be determined to enable (or require) either party to halt contract negotiations to report back to,
and gather input from, the community, if negotiations touch on key issues identified by the
community beforehand.

109

Affolder, supra note 104, at 164.
See also Cotula, supra note 70, at 169 (“Addressing these questions may require step-by-step contracting—
whereby an initial investor-state contract outlines key specifics but keeps options open to enable FPIC and
impact assessments; and a fuller investor-state contract is informed by the outcomes of those local processes
including any community-investor agreements.”).
110
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To maximize the degree to which communities are able to participate, such processes could
involve local meetings that are culturally appropriate (i.e. implemented in accordance with
local customs and practices) and that would allow for consultation with members of the
community, their representatives, and local civil society groups. As for any consultation
process, specific strategies may be needed to facilitate the meaningful participation of
marginalized segments of the community, such as ensuring meetings are convened at
accessible times, convening separate meetings for different segments, and providing for
appropriate translation into local languages. Some investment projects will affect multiple
communities who may not necessarily share the same culture, and the customs and
perspectives of each should be appropriate factored into design of participatory processes.111
Depending on the local context, a range of media and communications technologies could be
used to share information and publicize meetings. Where appropriate, online contract
repositories could also be used to publish draft versions of contracts,112 along with resources
that make it easier for affected persons and technical support providers of their own choosing
to understand the implications of the draft contract and to formulate their subsequent
submissions to the negotiating parties.

Where there are credible concerns regarding the commercial sensitivity of information
contained within the contract, consultations could be conducted with a lightly redacted
version of the draft agreement. Alternatively, consultations could take place solely with
community representatives and local civil society groups on a confidential basis, on the
111

Indigenous Representative, Intervention at Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment and Middlesex
University workshop (Apr. 25, 2019).
112
For example, OpenLandContracts.org hosts investment contracts between investors and host governments
relating to agriculture and forestry investments; each contract is accompanied by plain language summaries of
the contract’s key social, environmental, fiscal, and operational provisions. OPENLANDCONTRACTS.ORG,
http://OpenLandContracts.org (last visited May 23, 2020). ResourceContracts.org provides a similar platform
for oil, gas and mining contracts. RESOURCECONTRACTS.ORG, http://ResourceContracts.org (last visited May 23,
2020).
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understanding that information of a general nature would then be the subject of more
widespread consultations with community members. Another alternative in such
circumstances would be to adopt consultative committees, which would include
representatives from any traditional community decision-making structures as well as
members of all segments of the community, including women, religious minorities, youth,
workers, the elderly, people with disabilities, and so on, as well as representatives from civil
society organizations that support them. Regardless of which modality is employed, all
potential impacts on community rights would need to be accessibly disclosed before
decision-making in order to constitute meaningful consultation; to meet the FPIC standard,
community FPIC would need to be sought in relation to those impacts and any measures
instituted to mitigate them.

Opportunities and challenges
The likelihood of governments and companies agreeing to community demands for this
option may be bolstered by the fact that this option shares some features with existing
consultation processes, and provides avenues to protect commercially sensitive information.
Negotiators may, however, be reluctant to halt negotiations when they have gained
momentum; mechanisms would be needed to ensure that the breaks between negotiation
rounds are sufficiently long, and can be periodically triggered, to ensure the community has
ample opportunity to follow developments and offer its perspective.
This option deepens consultations with communities beyond mere one-off ex ante
consultations,113 by providing the community with regular updates on negotiations and, if

113

For an example of the shortcomings of solely conducting ex ante consultations in the extractive industries
context, see KIENZLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 45 (“A civil society representative noted that the government
engaged with them in advance of negotiations for a mining agreement. However, despite the CSO’s efforts to
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carried out meaningfully, providing opportunities for community members to influence and
shape negotiations. The lack of community or civil society presence at negotiations, however,
renders community members reliant on other actors to keep them updated on the progress of
negotiations. Absence from the negotiating table also limits the community’s ability to shape
the agenda of contract negotiations and to ensure that their concerns are adequately reflected
in the structure and substance of the investment contract. Any restrictions on a community’s
access to the draft agreement would also significantly undermine its ability to participate
meaningfully, given the importance of the wording of contract clauses.

Another challenge with this approach would be ensuring that breaks between negotiation
rounds allowed a sufficient amount of time to enable the consultation to take place
meaningfully. This may be hard to achieve when negotiations move quickly unless clear
criteria for triggering a break in negotiations are set out. Yet negotiating timetables may not
allow for adequate consultation with communities. Even when a community has a
representative in the room, the involvement of different segments of the community may be
limited because of time pressures faced by the company, as community elders found in the
Ekati Diamond Mine negotiations.114 This highlights the even greater difficulties that nonrepresented communities may face. Requiring the negotiators to comply with any community
requests to halt negotiations to enable them to consult and deliberate internally would be
crucial.

have local communities included in the actual negotiations, they were not consulted in any way during talks, nor
did the government or the company come back after the deal was completed to inform the people what was
agreed to.”).
114
WEITZNER, supra note 71, at 13 (“‘When the negotiation was happening, the Elders weren’t informed until it
was too late,’ one Elder said. ‘But even though when the negotiators came back to the Elders to give them
information, it was already processed. They were informed, but then it was too late. And the government was
already ahead with the mines.’”).
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Overall, this option holds some potential for improving consultation processes at the
negotiation stage, by ensuring that communities are aware of developments and, potentially,
that they can voice concerns and shape negotiations while they take place (though this will
depend on the degree to which either party to the negotiations accurately reports back to the
community and allows for community perspectives to influence negotiations). The option is
less attractive as a means of ensuring FPIC: while communities may be more “informed,” and
while such processes would take place “prior” to the contract being finalized, the degree to
which any consent is “free” may be undermined by the lack of opportunity to consider
alternative options. Such an approach also risks the state proceeding to authorize projects in
the absence of community consent, regardless of whether it has demonstrated that authorizing
the project in the absence of such consent is meets the necessity and proportionality tests
mentioned under “A proviso…” above.

4. Option two: Community participation in negotiations, as a non-party
A second option for improved consultation and FPIC at the contract negotiation stage
involves community representatives being present at, and directly participating in, investment
contract negotiations, but not actually signing the agreement as a contractual party. The
degree to which the community’s representatives were able to participate would be
influenced by their ability and willingness to follow and participate in discussions, and may
also be affected by the attitudes of the government and company negotiators. Under such an
arrangement, community representatives may need time and resources for skill building and
preparation, as well as ongoing support, for example, from an adequately trained interpreter
and, potentially, from legal advisors or civil society allies. Community representatives would
also benefit from reserving the right to put negotiations on hold if more time is needed to
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consult with the broader community to obtain input on unexpected proposals or
developments.

Representatives of communities and civil society organizations have already participated in
negotiations with host governments and companies in ways similar to the approach outlined
in this option. Examples include: the aforementioned reported inclusion of the Tindilo
community in negotiations for an investment contract for the Tree Farms Sudan tree
plantation and forestry conservation project in Southern Sudan (which had an annexed
Community Support Program agreement between the community and the government);115 the
participation by Aboriginal representatives in contractual negotiations for the Ekati Diamond
Mine, also discussed above;116 and Afghanistan EITI’s presence as an observer of investment
contract negotiations for an extractive project.117

The exact mechanism for determining who will represent the community at negotiations will
vary, but should result in the selection of community members who are truly representative of
the broader community. While traditional councils or other customary decision-making
structures may be appropriate, these will often need to be accompanied by representatives
from relevant segments of the community to ensure all perspectives are represented.118 Also,
as noted under option one, it will still be vital for community representatives to regularly
report back to, and consult with, community members regarding the negotiations to ensure
community members remain informed and can offer their opinions on new developments.
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CHRGJ, supra note 102, at 16.
WEITZNER, supra note 71, at 6; Affolder, supra note 104, at 156; O’FAIRCHEALLAIGH, supra note 104.
117
KIENZLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 45.
118
For instance, during the negotiations for the Ekati Diamond Mine, the Lutsel K’e Dene’s council represented
that community in negotiations, resulting in youth groups and Elders feeling that their views were not
sufficiently represented. WEITZNER, supra note 71, at 12–13.
116
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Despite not being a formal party to any investment contract negotiated under this option,
communities can use their participation in negotiations to bolster the enforceability of related
community-investor or community-government agreements, which can be referenced in, or
annexed to, the investment contract between the investor company and the state. For instance,
the Community Support Program agreement for the Tindilo community is referenced in the
investment contract for that project.119 Communities can also seek to include third party
beneficiary clauses in the investment contract,120 though it is not yet common for such
clauses to be created to the benefit of affected communities in investment contracts. Such
clauses could identify the community as having enforceable rights under the investment
contract—for instance, regarding company obligations to protect the environment or to avoid
negative human rights impacts.121

Opportunities and challenges
This option would immediately increase the community’s access to information regarding the
negotiations, and would provide another forum for community representatives to
communicate and share their perspectives with the government and the investor. Being in the
119

Land Title Agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry, Central Equatoria State, and Tree
Farms Sudan Ltd., art. 4.6 (2008), http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf2526678534/view#/pdf/page/2/annotation/24035.
120
In the agricultural context, see, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between the Sierra Leone Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of Trade
and Industry, and Sierra Land Development Ltd., art. 6, appendix, arts. 10–11 (2013),
http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2317427356/view# (granting third party beneficiary
rights to the investor’s shareholders, contractors and subcontractors with regard to a stabilization clause and a
clause prohibiting nationalization and expropriation). In the extractive industries context, see, e.g., Mineral
Development Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Liberia, Western Cluster Limited, Sesa
Goa Limited, Bloom Fountain Limited, and Elenilto Minerals & Mining LLC, art. 27.9 (2011),
http://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-6207349867/view#/pdf (granting third party beneficiary rights
to the investors’ shareholders to invoke mediation and arbitration rights).
121
International Senior Lawyers Project & Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Guide to Land
Contracts: Forestry Projects 8 (2017), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/01/GuidetoLandContractsForestryProjects.pdf; UNIDROIT Working Group on Agricultural Land Investment Contracts,
UNIDROIT/FAO/IFAD Legal Guide on Agricultural Land Investment Contracts: ALIC Zero Draft 32–33
(2019).
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negotiation room also creates more opportunities for community representatives to influence
negotiations—both substantively and, if negotiations are proceeding too quickly or if a break
is needed to allow for further consultation with community members, procedurally.

The principal challenge of this option is that the community’s ability to influence
negotiations might be undermined by the fact that it is not a formal party to the agreement.
There will be no guarantee that the community will be able to shape what is agreed upon,
especially if the contracting parties begin to “backchannel” negotiations away from the
community’s scrutiny.

Nevertheless, this approach does create the potential for improved consultation, given that
community representatives will be more informed regarding the direction negotiations take,
and will be well-placed to seek to influence negotiations as they take place. It also can
contribute to ensuring communities are informed, as required by FPIC requirements.
However, to the extent that communities risk having their views ignored during negotiations
this option will fall short of being an adequate instantiation of meaningful consultation or
FPIC.

5. Option three: Including the community as a party / Tripartite investment contracts
A third option for improved consultation and FPIC at the contract negotiation stage would
involve the community being a party to the investment contract. This would make the
contract a tripartite122 or “multi-actor”123 investment contract, with the host government, the
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BOUDREAUX & NEYMAN, supra note 66, at 37–38.
Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, Governments, Investors and Local Communities: Analysis of a Multi-Actor
Investment Contract Framework, 15 MELB. J. INT’L L. 473 (2014) [hereinafter Odumosu-Ayanu, MJIL];
Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, Multi-Actor Contracts, Competing Goals and Regulation of Foreign Investment,
123
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investor, and the local community (or communities or peoples) as parties. The contract would
set out the government’s and investor company’s obligations with regard to the investment as
it normally would in an investor-state contract. Depending on how the contract is structured,
the community could obtain enforceable rights to hold either actor to account if they were in
breach of the contract.

Examples of other types of tripartite contracts between governments, companies, and affected
communities exist, but only provide a limited insight into what tripartite investment contracts
for resource investments would include and how they would operate in practice. Tripartite
contracts also should not automatically be regarded as FPIC-compliant: their compliance will
depend on the circumstances in which they are negotiated and whether the option to withhold
consent is on the table, among other factors. One example of a tripartite agreement
requirement comes from Mozambique, which requires mining companies to enter into
tripartite memoranda of understanding with the government and families or communities who
may face resettlement, with such memoranda detailing the amount of compensation the
company will pay to those families or communities.124 Tripartite agreements in the context of
extractive industries have also been negotiated in Canada. For instance, a socio-economic
agreement for the Diavik Diamonds Project was entered into between the investor company
(Diavik Diamond Mines Inc., owned by Rio Tinto), the government of the Northwest
Territories of Canada, and five aboriginal signatories,125 some of whom were involved in the
Ekati Diamond Mine negotiations. The agreement focuses on benefit sharing, including

65 U.N.B.L.J. 269 (2014) [hereinafter Odumosu-Ayanu, UNBLJ]; UNIDROIT Working Group on Agricultural
Land Investment Contracts, supra note 121, at 31–32.
124
Mining Law No. 20/2014, art. 30 (Mozam.).
125
Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement between Diavik Diamond Mines Inc., Government of the Northwest
Territories, Dogrib Treaty 11 Council, Lutsel K’e Dene Band, North Slave Métis Alliance, Yellowknives Dene
First Nation, and Kitikmeot Inuit Association (1999), https://opencommunitycontracts.org/contract/northwestterritories-and-aboriginal-peoples-diavik-diamond-mines-1999-socio-economic-monitoring-agreement/.
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employment creation, and environmental monitoring, and was used as the basis for five
subsequent individual participation agreements with each aboriginal signatory.126 A second
example comes from the same Canadian territory; the Snap Lake environmental agreement
has as its parties the Government of Canada, the Government of the Northwest Territories,
the investor company (De Beers Canada Mining Inc.), and four aboriginal signatories.127 The
agreement focused on environmental management. While both agreements detail important
processes and mechanisms ancillary to the project—the Diavik agreement sets up an advisory
board and details the company’s benefit sharing commitments, while the Snap Lake
agreement establishes an environmental monitoring agency to be established by the
aboriginal signatories—neither cover the full range of issues usually included in investment
contracts. Finally, the Pooling and Sharing Joint Venture between the South African
government, Alexkor (a government-owned company), and a corporate vehicle for the
Richtersveld community is an example of a tripartite investment contract, albeit of a very
unique character. The agreement reportedly sees the two corporate parties pooling their
marine and land mining rights and having equal representation on the Joint Board, with
Alexkor entitled to a 51% share in the joint venture, and the community’s company entitled
to the remaining 49%.128 This agreement has been noted to arise from unique factors,
including a landmark court ruling in favor of the community that legally recognized the
community’s customary ownership of land and mineral resources, and significant
government assistance and cooperation.129
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Communities with prior experience with formal negotiations—such as Indigenous
communities that have previously negotiated treaties with governments or community
development agreements with companies—will be especially well placed to embark upon this
mode of participation.130 It has also been suggested that tripartite contracts may be more
likely to work where there is a “special need for cooperation,” a manageable number of
contractual parties, and an expectation of cooperation—and not strategic stalling or
opposition—towards reaching an agreement.131 (This final criterion should not, however, be
regarded as fixed or binary. Community opposition, however vociferous, may often be a
result of failures by governments and companies to respect and operationalize community
rights to FPIC and meaningful participation in the first place. In such circumstances,
opposition may be one of a very limited set of options available to the community.132)

Opportunities and challenges
Provided the project-affected community would have adequate time and access to sufficient
resources, skill building, and technical support from lawyers, paralegals, and other support
providers, this option would strengthen the community’s opportunity to be meaningfully
consulted on, and to influence and potentially consent to, the exact parameters of the
investment contract eventually agreed upon. Opportunities for communities to set the agenda
of negotiations and exercise leverage over decision-making regarding the project’s design are
130
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generally rare.133 This option provides a genuine opportunity to do so, and may lead to
investment contracts that minimize the adverse impacts of, and potentially leverage the
benefits of, the investment projects.134 Close participation in negotiations can also help to set
expectations regarding the degree to which the community may wish to have a regular line of
communication with the company and to be involved in future decision-making regarding the
project when community members’ rights may be affected—potentially including in the
design of any resettlement plans and water management plans.

Tripartite contracts could also give the community rights to enforce the contract in the event
of breaches of obligations by the government or company. It would mean the community
would have enforceable contractual rights against both the government and the company
once negotiations have been finalized, and that any “benefits” or local development projects
that a company is required to undertake are established in the context of full awareness of the
community’s stated priorities, and its ability to enforce them. Linking clauses important for
the community to the validity of permissions for carrying out the investment—which is of
supreme importance to the investor—could give the community more leverage to enforce its
entitlements and hold the company to its responsibilities (though inclusion of such clauses
may be very difficult to achieve during negotiations). In addition, the prospect of an
enforceable contract may also increase the likelihood that the company and government
partners will properly engage with community proposals during negotiations, thereby
bolstering the degree to which the community can participate and drive decision-making.
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In both common law and civil law jurisdictions, the community, by being a party to the
contract, may also be able to invoke a rich body of contract law protections that are aimed at
addressing power imbalances between contracting parties. Common law protections include
protections against unconscionable conduct, misrepresentation, undue influence, and
duress;135 civil law protections include the doctrine of cause, protections against unfair
contract terms and defects of consent (including lesion), and requirements to provide
information.136 These protections echo FPIC requirements that consent and consultation be
“free,” and may thus provide an additional means of enforcing FPIC and consultation rights.
The availability of these protections could also create additional incentives for the
government and company to comply with the FPIC standard during the contract negotiation
stage.

This option too will face challenges, most of which might arise with options one and two as
well. In many instances, the community will face power imbalances, which may only be
partially mitigated, rather than alleviated, by skill building, empowerment, advice, sufficient
time and resources to prepare, and the promise of contractual law protections. Companies
may seek to “buy off” any community resistance to proposals137 and procure authorization
from individuals falsely purporting to represent the community.138 This option would also
require a degree of cooperation and inclusiveness afforded by the government that has so far
proven rare.139 Further, questions remain as to how the many host governments that already
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struggle to negotiate advantageous investment contracts140 would manage with a third party
in the room. In addition, community members participating in negotiations have reported
many adverse impacts in doing so, including stress and consultation fatigue, as well as
disputes within the community and with other communities regarding the amount and
allocation of financial benefits.141 There also is no guarantee that communities empowered to
participate in negotiations will be able to successfully negotiate agreements that meet
community concerns.142 Despite these challenges, the prospect of tripartite investment
contracts creates real possibilities for effectively building FPIC and consultation into
investment contract negotiations.

V. Conclusion
Government obligations with regard to consultation and FPIC are designed to enable
communities to exercise a greater degree of influence over decision-making regarding the use
of their lands and resources, and can also ensure greater protection of other human rights of
affected communities in the context of natural resource investments. Yet in practice, these
standards are rarely carried out adequately, despite important innovations by communities
and civil society allies. Investment contract negotiations are one stage of the investment
process that is relatively unexplored, and where current consultation or FPIC processes
conducted by governments and companies are almost always inadequate. Yet the importance
of getting meaningful consultation and FPIC right at this stage should not be underestimated:
the signing of an investment contract without meaningful consultation and consent will
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fundamentally limit the opportunities for communities to operationalize their rights to give or
withhold FPIC and to meaningfully participate in decision making. It will also increase the
risk of community grievances and conflict that can have disastrous consequences for investor
companies, investment chain actors, and host governments wishing to attract responsible
investment. This article has sought to highlight this deficiency and propose different options
for how these standards could be met at the investment contract negotiation stage. In doing so
it has considered the dynamic nature of contract negotiations and the various challenges that
communities seeking to be more closely involved in such a technical process may encounter.
The options in this article remain relatively untested, and many questions deserve further
attention. The options may not be relevant or of interest to communities who fundamentally
and resolutely oppose a proposed investment, or who insist on negotiating solely with the
government and not any private sector actor. The options may also be met with resistance
from public and private sector actors, who may perceive a threat to their control over the
existing status quo with regard to investment contract negotiations. In many other cases,
however, the options discussed can provide stakeholders involved in natural resource
investments with concrete ideas for strategies to improve practices with regard to investment
contract negotiations; such options are intended to lead to improved communication and
information sharing between stakeholders, greater influence and empowerment for
communities, and ultimately to decision-making around investments that is compliant with
human rights law and responsive to community needs and concerns.

Page 50

